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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction against 
Jerry Dee Griffiths for one count of Aggravated Robbery, a felony of 
the First Degree pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203 (1953 as 
amended), and two counts of Aggravated Assault, felonies of the 
Third Degree pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §70-5-103 (1953 as 
amended). A jury found the Appellant guilty following a trial held 
April 17 and 18, 1986, in the Third Judicial District, in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Dean E. Conder, 
Judge, presiding. 
Statement of Fact^ 
On January 5, 1986, the employees of Rocky Mountain Video 
were closing the store at approximately 7:0ti p.m. when a gunman 
entered the store. The gunman spoke first with Ron Smith, an 
employee, asking if he (Smith) was the manager. When Mr. Smith 
replied that he was not the manager the gunman said, "you'll do" (R. 
160) and showed Mr. Smith a gun that he was :arrying in his belt. 
The gunman stated, "This is a .357 Magnum. It's loaded. 
You try to be a hero, I'll kill you" (R. 161). Mr. Smith called for 
the manager, Edward Failner, who then came to the front of the 
store. The gunman then repeated the threat to Mr. Failner. When 
informed that there were others in the back of the store. The 
gunman ordered them to the front (R. 28). At that point Randy 
Herbert, the owner of the store, and her husband, Everett Herbert, 
came into the front of the store. 
The gunman became startled when a patron deposited movies 
in a night depository and pulled his gun out and pointed it at the 
individuals in the store (R. 204). The gunman then forced Mr. 
Failner to fill a bag with money and left the store with 
approximately $300 (R. 207). 
At about the same time Roger Mouritsen was down the street 
from the video store purchasing gasoline (R. 236). Mr. Mouritsen 
heard what he thought was a shot and then saw a man running 
diagonally across the street with a noticeable limp (R. 237). 
When the police arrived Mr. Smith described the gunman as 
having shoulder length dirty blonde hair, no beard and maybe a small 
moustache (R. 169). Mr. Smith also testified that the gunman had an 
upper tooth missing (R. 177). Mr. Failner described the gunman as 
having long dirty blond hair, three days growth of beard, no real 
moustache, and as having a missing tooth (R. 202). Mr. Herbert also 
testified that the gunman had a missing tooth (R. 287). 
On January 6, 1986, Jerry Griffiths sought medical 
attention for a gunshot wound in the instep of his right foot (R. 
138). Dr. Sherman Smith treated Mr. Griffiths and testified that 
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Mr. Griffiths explained that he had received the wound when 
exchanging a gun with a friend (R. 138). Darlene Newsome, Mr. 
Griffiths1 girlfriend, also testified that she witnessed the 
exchange in which Mr. Griffiths was injured on January 4, 1986 (R. 
330). Two other witnesses testified that they saw Mr. Griffiths on 
the morning of January 5 and that he did have an injured foot at 
that time (R. 304, 324). Dr. Smith testified that on January 6, 
1986 Mr. Griffiths had a "very exaggerated moustache" (R. 142). Dr. 
Smith called the authorities (R. 150) and Mr. Griffiths was later 
arrested on January 10, 1986. 
At the time of his arrest Mr. Griffiths made statements to 
I 
Detective Ron Edwards who later testified ^t trial (R. 358). These 
statements were not part of the discovery that was provided before 
trial. When these statements were used at trial, defense counsel 
moved for a mistrial but that motion was denied (R. 390, 393). Mr. 
Edwards also testified that at the time he arrested Mr. Griffiths, 
another arrest warrant was outstanding (R. 253). The court 
admonished the jury to disregard that statement (R. 254). 
The police held a lineup on February 4, 1986, for the 
witnesses of the robbery. At that time Mr. Smith and Mr. Herbert 
were unable to identify Mr. Griffiths as the gunman (R. 173, 287). 
Ms. Herbert positively identified a member of the lineup other than 
Mr. Griffiths as the gunman (R. 272). The only witness who 
identified Mr. Griffiths at the lineup was Mr. Failner (R. 213). 
All of the witnesses subsequently identified Mr. Griffiths 
as the gunman at trial. The fact was also noted at trial that Mr. 
Griffiths had a full upper dental plate (R. 302). All of the 
- 3 -
witnesses to the robbery testified that their assailant had a 
missing upper tooth. 
At trial Yvonne Silcox was allowed to testify that she had 
seen Mr. Griffiths on December 23, 1985 (R. 226). Defense counsel 
objected to her testimony because she was a victim of another 
robbery with which Mr. Griffiths was charged (R. 153). While Ms. 
Silcox did not testify concerning the facts of this prior robbery, 
she did testify that she had picked Mr. Griffiths from a police 
lineup (R. 227) and described Mr. Griffiths appearance in late 
December. 
At the close of the evidence defense counsel requested a 
jury instruction concerning eyewitness identification (R. 063) 
(Addendum A). The instruction was not given and defense counsel 
objected (R. 391). 
Following the trial to the jury Mr. Griffiths was found 
guilty of Aggravated Robbery and two counts of Aggravated Assault. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Appellant, Jerry Dee Griffiths, first contends that the 
trial court erred in refusing to give a requested instruction on 
eyewitness identification. In light of the tenuous identification 
of Mr. Griffiths, the court abused its discretion in refusing such 
an instruction. 
The Appellant contends that the trial court committed 
prejudicial error by allowing into evidence statements made by Mr. 
Griffiths at the time of his arrest because these statements were 
not provided to defense counsel through the discovery process. 
Finally, Mr. Griffiths argues that testimony concerning 
prior bad acts by him was improperly allowed into evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
T H E T R I A L C Q U R T C Q M M I T T E D PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY 
REFUSING TO GIVE THE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION CONCERNING IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY. 
At the 11: i d i defense coun^o) i pqiic ,1^ 1 Mi.if ra\\\ i nury 
1 n
°truc* . • -. 4 -n -e , :> ,°ee 
. - ,a. . '. '.-id. ''cur1 refuse^ . ^n * fl — ;-.>* 
instructions d.nd defense - * :•* 
'
jhdt.ii-». y c; r eyewr.ne.?.- testimony 
has been * documented .iemu .
 v ^ ^w * 
year.1- ^ ^ comment; .. * ,* *..-i.-. . iy 
M^-mo i i r nn.-r. '-rcepMon and me;..otif uuin ut 
which pla> ^ \ . - i. - i- eyewitness idenni • n. 
' Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert psychological Testimony 
on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 Stan. L. Rev, 
969 (1977); Due Process Standards for the Admissibility of 
Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 26 Kan. L. Rev. 461 (1978); 
Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Flaws and Defenses, 7 No. Ky. 
L. Rev. 407 (1980); Ellis, Davies, Shepherd, Experimental Studies of 
Face Identification, 3 Nat. J. Crim. Def. 219 (1977); Use oT~ 
Eyewitness Identification Evidence in Criminal Trials, 21 Crim. L.Q. 
361 (1979). Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony (1979); Public Defender 
Sourcebook, pp. 251-57 (S. Singer, Ed. 1976); Yarmey, The Psychology 
of Eyewitness Testimony, (1979); Buckhout, Determinants of 
Eyewitness Performance on a Lineup, 1974 Bull. Psychonomic Soc'y 
191; Buckhout, Eyewitness Identification and Psychology in the 
Courtroom, Crim. Def., September-October, 1977 at 5-9; Buckhout, 
Eyewitness Testimony, Scientific Am., Dec. 1974 at 23; Ellis, Davies 
& Shepherd, Experimental Studies of Face Identification, NatM J. 
Crim. Def. 219 (1977); Levin & Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal 
Identification; The Gap from Wade to Kirby, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 107 9 
(1973); Luce, The Neglected Dimension in Eyewitness Identification, 
Crim. Def., May-June, 1977 at 5-8; Tyrrell & Cunningham, Eyewitness 
Credibility: Adjusting the Sights of the Judiciary, 37 Ala. Law. 
563 , 575-85 (1976). 
In a frequently quoted passage, the late Felix Frankfurter, 
former United States Supreme Court Justice, observed: 
What is the worth of identification testimony 
even when uncontradicted? The identification of 
strangers is proverbially untrustworthy* The 
hazards of such testimony are established by a 
formidable number of instances in the records of 
English and American trials. These instances are 
recent—not due to the brutalities of ancient 
criminal procedure. . . 
Evidence as to identity based on personal 
impressions, however bona fide, is perhaps of all 
classes of evidence the least to be relied upon, 
and therefore, unless supported by other facts, 
an unsafe basis for the verdict of a jury. 
Frankfurter, The Trial of Sacco and Vanzetti. 
In United States v. Barber, 412 F.2d 417, 527 (3rd Cir. 
1971), the court examined the processes involved in human 
observations and came to the conclusion that: 
. . . where the circumstances surrounding the 
criminal act gave limited opportunity for 
observation or utilization of the sensory 
perception, or where uncertainty is expressed by 
the witness himself, or exposed by a past history 
of the witnessfs statements or demonstrated 
identity should be considered as only an 
expression of opinion and should be accompanied 
by appropriate instructions as to its sufficiency 
and weight. 
The instructions requested in the present case were very 
similar to the model instruction fashioned in United States v. 
Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The Telfaire Court in 
describing the need for such an instruction, stated: 
The presumption of innocence that safeguards the 
common law system must be a premise that is 
realized in instruction and not merely a 
promise. In pursuance of that objective, we have 
pointed out the importance of and need for 
special instruction on the key issue of 
identification, which emphasized to the jury the 
need for finding that the circumstances of the 
identification are convincing beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
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The Telfaire instruction was cited with approval by Justice 
Stewart in his dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Durham, in 
State v, Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982). In that case the 
majority opinion did not squarely address the issue of the 
requirement of such an instruction. This Court did not find 
reversible error in the trial court's refusal to give the 
instruction. The Court stated, "We have not heretofore held that 
such an instruction is required. We believe the giving of it should 
be left to the discretion of the trial court." _I_d. at 61. 
In State v. Schaffer, 638 P.2d 1185 (Utah 1981), this Court 
held that given the circumstances of that case, it was not 
reversible error for the trial court to refuse to give a Telfaire 
instruction. The Court did not say that no error was committed. 
Id. at 1187. However, Justice Stewart, writing in dissent, noted, 
"Although the majority opinion takes the 'instructions as a whole' 
and reaches its conclusion that they adequately advise the jury, the 
instructions are nothing more than boiler plate statements 
concerning burden of proof which do not deal with the problem at 
all." Ijd. at 1189. 
Similarly, in the present appeal, the instructions given to 
the jury were merely standard burden of proof instructions, and 
therefore failed to address the special problems associated with 
eyewitness identification. 
Prior to Long four Utah cases addressed the issue of 
eyewitness identification. Each of the cases continued to support 
the proposition that the giving of cautionary jury instructions 
- 8 -
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In State v. Jonas, 725 P.2d 1378 (Utah 1986), this Court 
found an abuse of discretion by a trial court in refusing to give a 
requested cautionary instruction. In Jonas the victim had only seen 
his assailant for a few seconds at night before being knocked 
unconscious. In a concurring opinion to Jonas, Justice Stewart 
mentioned that, "[T]he jury should know that it should carefully 
assess the witness and all prior identification he had made to 
determine what weight should be given the identification." I_d. at 
1381. 
In this case four witnesses were present at the robbery of 
Rocky Mountain Video. Of these four witnesses only one was able to 
identify Mr. Griffiths in a lineup held on February 4, 1986. The 
description given by witness Ron Smith was that his assailant had 
shoulder-length dirty blond hair, no beard, and maybe a small 
moustache (R. 169). He also stated that the assailant had a tooth 
missing from his upper teeth (R. 177). However, Mr. Smith was 
unable to identify Mr. Griffiths as his assailant at the lineup of 
February 4 (R. 173) but later identified Mr. Griffiths as his 
assailant at trial (R. 192). 
Edward Failner, the manager of Rocky Mountain Video, also 
described the assailant as having long, dirty blonde hair, three 
days growth of facial hair with no real moustache, and having a 
missing tooth (R. 202). Mr. Failner was the only witness who 
identified Mr. Griffiths at the February 4 lineup (R. 213). 
Randy Herbert, the owner of the video store, not only 
failed to identify Mr. Griffiths at the February 4 lineup but 
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identifications to determine what weight should be given the 
identification" 725 P.2d at 1375. In this case with so much 
depending on eyewitness testimony, the jury should have been 
informed about the dangers of such testimony. In the absence of 
physical evidence, the defendant is entitled to inform the jury of 
the factors which affect the reliability of eyewitness 
identifications. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR MISTRIAL SINCE THE STATE FAILED TO 
PROVIDE DEFENSE COUNSEL WITH STATEMENTS MADE BY 
MR. GRIFFITHS TO THE POLICE BEFORE TRIAL. 
Before trial, defense counsel submitted a request for 
discovery pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-35-16(a) (1953 as amended) 
(R. 17-19). Section 77-35-16(a) provides: 
Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor 
shall disclose to the defense upon request the 
following material or information of which he has 
knowledge. 
(1) Relevant written or recorded statements of 
the defendant or co-defendants; 
(2) The criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) Physical evidence seized from the defendant 
or co-defendant; 
(4) Evidence known to the prosecutor that tends 
to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the 
guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of 
the offense for reduced punishment; and 
(5) Any other item of evidence which the court 
determines on good cause shown should be made 
available to the defendant in order for the 
defendant to adequately prepare his defense. 
Defense counsel specifically requested "all written or recorded 
statements of the defendant" (R. 017) (Addendum B). 
In response to the discovery request, defense counsel was 
presented with some police reports but none containing any 
statements made by Mr. Griffiths. Minutes before trial, the 
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pursuant to §77-35-16(a), a prosecutor must 
comply. To meet basic standards of fairness and 
to ensure that a trial is a real quest for truth 
and not simply a contest between the parties to 
win, a defendant's request for information which 
has been voluntarily complied with, or a court 
order of discovery must be deemed to be deemed a 
continuing request. And even though there is no 
court-ordered disclosure, a prosecutor's failure 
to disclose newly discovered inculpatory 
information which falls with the ambit of 
§77-35-16(a), after the prosecution has made a 
voluntary disclosure of evidence might so mislead 
defendants to cause prejudicial error. 
Id. at 662. 
In the instant case the prosecutor's failure to provide 
defense counsel with statements made by Mr. Griffiths to the police 
after his arrest clearly denied him a fair trial. Defense counsel 
made a request for discovery under Utah Code Ann. §77-35~16(a) which 
provides specifically for the disclosure of any "relevant written or 
recorded statements of the defendant." 
The statements by Mr. Griffiths to the police were used by 
the prosecution in this case to discredit Mr. Griffiths' alibi and 
to contradict the testimony of Darlene Newsome. Ms. Newsome 
testified that Mr. Griffiths had been injured when exchanging a gun 
with a man named Dan or Don (R. 332). Mr. Griffiths told the police 
that the man's name was Mike (R. 363). This type of impeachment was 
typical of the manner in which Mr. Griffiths' statements were used 
against him. This is not the type of material a prosecutor will 
fail to recognize as significant to the defense yet the prosecutor 
in this case waited until moments before trial to present these 
statements to defense counsel. 
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The use of these supplemental police reports against Mr. 
Griffiths turned the trial in this matter into an "adversarial 
contest between two competing sides." By failing to disclose the 
requested material the prosecutor so misled the defense as to cause 
prejudicial error. The non-disclosed statements in this case were 
vital to the verdict that was rendered. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING TESTIMONY 
OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR BAD ACTS. 
The general rule regarding the admission into evidence of 
other offenses or similar acts is summarized in State v. Saunders, 
699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985): 
[4] The basis of these limitations on the 
admissibility of evidence of prior crimes is the 
tendency of a fact finder to convict the accused 
because of bad character rather than because he 
is shown to be guilty of the offenses charged. 
Because of this tendency, such evidence is 
presumed prejudicial and, absent a reason for the 
admission of the evidence other than to show 
criminal disposition, the evidence is excluded. 
(Citations omitted.) 
In Utah the rule that governs this type of evidence is Rule 
404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence which provides: 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of 
other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to 
prove the character of a person in order to show 
that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, 
however, be admissible for other purposes, such 
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident. 
This court in reversing the conviction in Saunders was well 
aware of the harm that is presented when evidence of prior bad acts 
is allowed into evidence. 
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In the instant case the Appellant was prejudiced by two 
forms of prior bad act testimony. The first was the testimony of 
Detective Ron Edwards that he advised the Appellant at the time of 
his arrest of "another warrant out of West Valley" (R. 253). This 
testimony allowed the jury to know that the Appellant was a suspect 
in a totally unrelated case. The trial court admonished the jury to 
disregard the statement. The fact that such an admonition was given 
does not detract from the prejudice that the Appellant suffered. 
Justice Jackson in a concurring opinion in Krulewith v. United 
States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) stated, "The naive assumption that 
prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury... 
all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction." 
The other example of prior bad acts admitted into evidence 
was the testimony of Yvonne Silcox. Ms. Silcox was the victim of an 
unrelated robbery in December, 1985 (R. 153), and she was allowed to 
testify about the Appellant's appearance at that time. Ms. Silcox 
also testified that she attended the police lineup in this case (R. 
227) . 
Allowing Ms. Silcox to testify about attending a police 
lineup and identifying the defendant at that lineup inferred that 
she also was a victim of a robbery. The trial court, by allowing 
this inference, prejudiced the defendant in the minds of the 
jurors. The jury was aware that only victims generally attend 
lineups. By allowing this testimony the trial court allowed 
evidence of a prior bad act not relevant to the case at trial. 
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The prejudice these admissions caused the Appellant is 
clear. The jury was allowed to consider Mr. Griffiths1 bad 
character rather than any evidence of the robbery for which he was 
tried. 
CONCLUSION 
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, the Appellant, 
Jerry Dee Griffiths, asks this Court to reverse his conviction and 
remand his case to the lower court for either dismissal of the 
charges or a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this £-—day of January, 1987. 
M* JL&: 
^mm R. BROWN 
^Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, LYNN R. BROWN, do hereby certify that four copies of the 
foregoing Appellantfs Brief will be delivered to the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114, this X day of January, 1987. 
yruu R. BROWN 
Attorney for Appellant 




One of the important issues of this case is the 
identification of the Defendant. The State has the burden of 
proving identity beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Identification testimony is an expression of belief or 
impression by the witness. In this case, the witness has 
testified that he recognized JERRY DEE GRIFFITHS as a 
participant in the crime. You must decide whether there is a 
reasonable doubt in this identification. In appraising the 
identification testimony, you should consider the following: 
1. Did the witness have the capacity and opportunity 
to observe the offender? 
2. Is the identification made by the witness a 
product of his own recollection? 
3. Has the witness failed to identify the defendant 
on a previous occasion? 
4. Is the identification witness credible? 
If, after considering these factors, you have a 
reasonable doubt as to the accuracy of the identification you 
must find the Defendant, JERRY DEE GRIFFITHS, not guilty. 
United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972) 
United States v. Barger, 442 P.2d 517 (3rd Cir. 1971) 
Macklin v. United States, 409P.2d 174 (D.C. Cir. 1969) 
Commonwealth v. Bowden, 399 N.E. 2d 482 (Mass. 1980) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
One of the important issues in this case is the 
identification of the defendant as the perpetrator of the 
crime. The State has the burden of proving identity, beyond a 
reasonable doubt. It is not essential that the witness himself 
be free from doubt as to the correctness of his statement. 
However, you the jury, must be satisfied beyond a reasonable 
doubt of the accuracy of the identification of the defendant 
before you may convict him. If you are not convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant was the person who 
committed the crime, you must find the defendant not guilty. 
Identification testimony is an expression of belief or 
impression by the witness. Its value depends on the 
opportunity the witness had to observe the offender at the time 
of the offense and to make a reliable identification later. 
In appraising the identification testimony of a 
witness, you should consider the following: 
(1) Are you convinced that the witness had the 
capacity and an adequate opportunity to observe the offender? 
Whether the witness had an adequate opportunity to 
observe the offender at the time of the offense will be 
affected by such matters as how long or short a time was 
available, how far or close the witness was, how good were 
lighting conditions, whether the witness had had occasion to 
see or know the person in the past. 
(2) Are you satisfied that the identification made by 
the witness after the offense was the product of his own 
recollection? You may take into account both the strength of 
the identification, and the circumstances under which the 
identification was made. 
If the identification by the witness may have been 
influenced by the circumstances under which the defendant was 
presented to him for identification, you should scrutinize the 
identification with great care. You may also consider the 
length of time that lapsed between the occurrence of the crime 
and the next opportunity of the witness to see defendant, as a 
factor bearing on the reliability of the identification. 
(3) You may take into account any occasions in which 
the witness failed to make an identification of defendant, or 
made an identification that was inconsistent with this 
identification at trial. 
(4) Finally, you must consider the credibility of 
each identification witness in the same way as any other 
witness, consider whether he is truthful, and consider whether 
he had the capacity and opportunity to make a reliable 
observation on the matter covered in his testimony. 
It is again to be emphasized that the burden of proof 
on the prosecutor extends to every element of the crime 
charged, and this specifically includes the burden of proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of the defendant as 
perpetrator of the crime with which he stands charged. If 
after examining the testimony, you have a reasonable doubt as 
to the accuracy of the identification, you must find the 
defendant not guilty. 
ADDENDUM B 
LYNN R. BROWN (#0460) 
Attorney for Defendant 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
2 8 1986 
H DixcWtmcifey, Clerk 3ra Dist Court 
B T -
rVoufv OJprk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICtAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
7&.-
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
MOTION TO DISCOVER AND 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
-v-
JERRY DEE GRIFFITHS, 
De fendan t 
Case No. CR36- 1 8 l ^ j 3 R 8 6 - 183JD 
CR86-134, CR86-185 
( Judge Dean E. Conder) 
COMES NOW the Defendant by and through Defense 
Counsel and requests the following material be provided to them 
as discovery pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-35-16, Bradv v. 
Maryland, 337 U.S. 83 (1963), United States v. Agurs , 427 U.S. 
97 (1976) and Due Process required by the Constitutions of 
Utah and the United States: 
1. All police reports concerning this investigation 
of the above entitled cases; 
2. All written or recorded statements of the 
Defendant, if any; 
3. All evidence tending to negate the guilt of the 
Defendant; 
4. All evidence tending to mitigate the guilt of 
the Defendant; 
5. The date and time the robbery happened; 
6. Any evidence tending to mitigate the degree 
of the offense for reduced punishment; 
7. All witnesses, names and addresses which the State 
may call at the time of the trial; and 
8. All physical evidence taken and all investigative 
analysis done on any evidence in the above-entitled case. 
As provided in Rule 16, Section 77-35-5(b), the State 
shall make all above disclosures as soon as practicable following 
the filing of charges and before the Defendant is reauired to 
plead. 
~ATED this <P"7 day of February, 1986. 
Respectfully submitted, 
*V£VNN R. BROWN ^ 
^ Attorney for Defendant 
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